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Abstract
The Einstein, Podolski and Rosen (EPR) argument aiming to prove
the incompleteness of quantum mechanics (QM) was opposed by most
EPR’s contemporary physicists and is not accepted within the standard
interpretation of QM, which maintains that QM is a complete theory. An
analysis of the semantic implications of the opponent positions shows that
they imply different notions of truth. The introduction of a nonclassical
notion of truth within the standard interpretation is usually justified by
referring to known theorems that should prove that QM is a contextual
and nonlocal theory. However, these theorems are based on a doubtful
implicit epistemological assumption. If one renounces it, one can provide
an alternative interpretation of QM that it realistic in a semantic sense.
Within this interpretation the EPR viewpoint is recovered and QM is
considered a (semantically) incomplete, noncontextual and local theory.
Furthermore, the new interpretation provides several suggestions for con-
structing a more general theory embedding QM and for connecting QM
with classical physics and relativity.
Key words: quantummechanics, completeness, quantum truth, stan-
dard interpretation, SR interpretation.
1 Introduction
The famous paper by Einstein, Podolski and Rosen (EPR) aiming to prove the
incompleteness of quantum mechanics (Einstein et al., 1935) opened a debate
that is still alive among scholars concerned with the foundations and the phi-
losophy of QM. It is well known that the EPR position was not accepted by
the majority of contemporary physicists, and that the viewpoint of EPR’s op-
ponents (above all, Bohr’s) became the official doctrine of quantum physicists
(briefly, even if imprecisely, Copenhagen, or standard, interpretation).
Basing on several papers by ourselves on topics connected with the EPR
issue, we want to show in this article that a careful analysis of the semantic
implications of the two positions greatly helps to understand the terms of the
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debate and provides a new perspective for solving old quantum problems and
avoiding known quantum paradoxes. To this end, we provide a brief summary
of the EPR’s argument in Sec. 2, and resume their opponents’ arguments in
Sec. 3. Then we argue in Sec. 4 that EPR’s viewpoint is compatible with
the adoption of a classical (Tarskian) conception of truth as correspondence
for a suitable fragment of the observative language of QM, while the standard
interpretation adopts a non-Tarskian verificationist conception of truth for the
same fragment. The choice of the standard interpretation is commented on
in Sec. 5, where we remind that it is usually supported by some famous the-
orems that are maintained to prove that QM is necessarily a contextual and
nonlocal theory. In the same section we show, however, that these theorems are
based on an implicit epistemological assumption which contradicts the claimed
anti-metaphysical character of QM. Thus, if one renounces this assumption, the
standard interpretation does not appear any more as logically necessary, and
one can envisage a new interpretation of QM that adopts the classical concep-
tion of truth mentioned above, so that, according to it, QM would turn out
to be a noncontextual, local and incomplete theory, consistently with the EPR
philosophical position. Finally, we remind in Sec. 6 that an interpretation of
this kind has been actually constructed by ourselves (semantic realism, or SR,
interpretation) and observe that this interpretation provides a number of hints
for constructing a more general theory embedding QM and for connecting QM
with classical physics (CM) and relativity. In particular, the SR interpretation
suggests that the difficulties encountered by physicists when trying to interpret
CM as a limit of QM, or to join consistently QM and relativity, could depend on
the adoption of different concepts of truth within these physical theories (quan-
tum truth, which produces contextuality and nonlocality, within the standard
interpretation of QM; classical truth, which produces noncontextuality and lo-
cality, within CM and relativity). This incommensurability of theories would
then be avoided if the SR interpretation of QM is accepted.
2 The EPR incompleteness argument
Let us schematize briefly the essentials of the EPR argument by using an up-
dated terminology and following the scheme provided by Jammer in his funda-
mental book on the philosophy of QM (Jammer, 1974).
The EPR paper can be divided into four parts, as follows.
Part 1. The following conditions are stated.
Condition of completeness: “...every element of the physical reality must
have a counterpart in the physical theory”.
Condition of reality: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can
predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this
physical quantity”.
Part 2. There are pairs of (noncompatible) observables whose values cannot
both be known with arbitrary precision in QM (the position and the momentum
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of a particle are observables of this kind). Hence, two alternatives occur.
(i) The values of the two observables are not simultaneously real.
(ii) QM is an incomplete theory.
Part 3. By considering a “combined” physical system consisting of two
physical systems (actually, particles), say I and II, it is possible to prepare
the combined system in a state S in which a measurement of the position of
system I would allow one to predict with certainty, by using the laws of QM,
the value of the position of system II, while a measurement of the momentum of
system I would allow one to predict, again by using the laws of QM, the value
of the momentum of system II. Furthermore, “since at the time of measurement
the two systems no longer interact, no real change can take place in the second
system in consequence of anything that may be done in the first system”. Hence,
both the position and the momentum of system II correspond to elements of
physical reality whenever the combined system is in the state S.
Part 4. The conclusion in Part 3 shows that the alternative (i) in Part 2
must be rejected. Hence, QM is an incomplete theory.
It is interesting to note that EPR’s argument is based on counterfactual
reasonings, since the measurements of position and momentum on system I
cannot be carried out simultaneously. The authors are well aware of this, for
they wrote at the end of the paper:
“... one would not arrive at our conclusion if one insisted that
two or more physical quantities can be regarded as simultaneous
elements of reality only when they can be simultaneously measured
or predicted. On this point of view, since either one or the other, but
not both simultaneously, of the quantities P and Q can be predicted,
they are not simultaneously real. This makes the reality of P and
Q depend upon the process of measurement carried out on the first
system, which does not disturb the second system in any way. No
reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit this.”
Thus, EPR based the defence of their conclusion on a sharp distinction be-
tween reality and empirical knowledge of reality. This distinction anticipates on
the ontological ground the distinction between truth and epistemic accessibility
of truth that will be discussed in Sec. 5.
3 The objections to the EPR argument
The reactions to the incompleteness argument summarized in Sec. 1 were im-
mediate and generally critical (we refer again to Jammer’s book quoted in Sec.
2 for a detailed report on this issue). In particular, Bohr’s rejection of EPR’s
conclusions (Bohr, 1935a, 1935b) was mainly based on his ‘relational conception
of quantum states’. According to this conception, particles and experimental ar-
rangements form an inseparable unit, so that no independent element of reality
can be attributed to system II (hence EPR’s criterion of reality is refuted). The
two measurements considered in the EPR argument are essentially different,
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and the results obtained in them cannot be attributed to system II, separating
this system from the two different “wholeness” to which it belongs in the two
cases. Therefore, QM is a complete theory in the sense that there is nothing in
the world besides what QM allows us to describe.
Bohr’s position resumed above is not completely accepted in the current
manuals (see, e.g., Messiah, 1961; Cohen-Tannoudij et al., 1973; Greiner, 1989)
reporting the standard interpretation of QM, where a position closer to Heisen-
berg’s (Heisenberg, 1961) is adopted. Indeed, whenever one considers a physical
system made up by two subsystems, one usually accepts considering the prop-
erties of one of the component subsystems. Yet, for every state S of the whole
system one distinguishes between properties that are certainly possessed by the
subsystem (i.e., properties that are real, or actual, in S) and properties that may
be possessed or not (i.e., properties that are potential in S). In the physical situ-
ation described by EPR some properties of system II (to be precise, the property
of having a sharp position and the property of having a sharp momentum), that
are not actual in the state S, are actualized by the measuring processes, which
also change the state. Yet, the property actualized in a position measurement
is different from the property actualized in a momentum measurement, and the
two properties do not refer to the same final state nor can be attributed to sys-
tem II simultaneously. Thus, again, QM must be considered a complete theory
in the sense expounded above.
The foregoing criticisms share a common feature. Both, indeeed, consider
QM as a contextual (in the sense that the measurement context cannot be
separated by the physical system that is inquired) and nonlocal (in the sense
that contextuality holds also at a distance) theory. Of course, nonlocality implies
contextuality and contradicts EPR’s locality assumption that a measurement on
system I cannot induce real changes on system II if the two systems no longer
interact (Sec. 2).
Though nonlocality be fascinating because of the olistic perspective that it
introduces in physics, its consequences are upsetting. Let us consider indeed its
most immediate implications.
At a physical level it emerges an action at a distance that is completely
different from the physical interactions described by the formalism of classical
and quantum mechanics.
At an ontological level, some potential (real) properties of a physical system
become real (potential) because of choices of an observer who can be as far away
as desired from the physical system that is considered (though the observer
cannot decide at will the final results of his measurements).
At a semantic level, there are statements that attribute physical properties
to the system but have no truth value (hence no meaning) until some new
knowledge about the system is attained by a far away observer.
Nothwithstanding the problems pointed out above, nonlocality is accepted
by most physicists as an intrinsic and unavoidable feature of QM. We will try to
explain in Sec. 5 why an interpretation of QM has been adopted that is highly
problematical, and to discuss whether there are alternatives to it. To this end,
however, an intermediate step is needed.
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4 Truth and semantic completeness in QM
The two different viewpoints about the completeness of QM discussed in Secs.
2 and 3 can be better understood in our opinion if one momentarily leaves
apart any philosophical committment and concentrates on a semantic investi-
gation about the language of QM, pointing out in particular the truth criteria
underlying it according to the two perspectives and the consequences about
completeness (now meant in a purely semantic sense) that follow from these
truth criteria. An investigation of this kind has been done by ourselves in some
recent papers (Garola and Sozzo, 2004; Garola, 2005) and we cannot report it
here in details. The essentials of our arguments can, however, be resumed as
follows.
First of all, we must remind some features of the general epistemological per-
spective, or received viewpoint (Braithwaite, 1953; Hempel, 1965) that we adopt
in this paper. According to this perspective, any physical theory T is stated by
means of a general language that contains, in particular, a theoretical language
(which constitutes the formal apparatus of T and contains terms denoting theo-
retical entities) and an observative language 1. The former is linked to the latter
by means of correspondence rules, which provide a partial and indirect interpre-
tation of it. The latter is interpreted by means of assignment rules, which make
some symbols of the observative language correspond to macroscopic entities,
as preparing or registering devices, outcomes of measurements, and so on.
Basing on the above scheme, let us observe now that, via assignment rules,
any interpretation of T adopts, often implicitly, a theory of truth, which de-
fines truth values for some (not necessarily all) statements of the observative
language. Whenever an interpretation is given, we call T semantically objec-
tive with respect to a fragment L of the observative language if and only if the
theory of truth adopted in it defines truth values for all elementary statements
of L. Furthermore, we call T semantically complete with respect to L if and
only if, in any given physical situation, it allows to predict the truth values of
all statements of L that have a truth value according to the truth theory that
has been adopted.
Let us come to EPR. These authors adopted in their paper an ontological
form of realism (local realism, see Secs. 2 and 3) which is compatible with a
classical theory of truth as correspondence, as explicated rigorously by Tarski
(Tarski, 1956, 1944), for the observative language of QM. To be precise, let us
consider an elementary statement E(x) that attributes a physical property E to
a sample x of the physical system in a given state S (briefly called physical object
in the following). This statement belongs to the standard observative language
of QM, and the set of all statements of this kind constitutes a fragment of
the observative language. Let us denote by E the set of all properties that
the physical object x can possess, and let us denote the aforesaid fragment by
E(x), so that, obviously, E(x)={E(x) | E ∈ E}. Then EPR’s local realism is
compatible with the adoption of a classical (Tarskian) theory of truth for E(x) 2
(hence for a predicate calculus with standard connectives which has E(x) as set
of elementary formulas; we do not insist on this issue for the sake of brevity).
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According to this theory all statements of E(x) have simultaneous truth values
(true/false), hence QM is semantically objective with respect to E(x). Yet, since
the truth values of all statements of E(x) cannot be simultaneously predicted
by QM, QM is not semantically complete with respect to E(x) 3.
It is now important to remind that, according to the classical (Tarskian)
theory of truth, truth values are defined by means of a set-theoretical model,
so that their definition is independent of the existence of procedures which may
lead to know them. Briefly, truth and epistemic accessibility of truth are different
concepts. Thus, it can occur that the truth value of a statement E(x) is defined
but cannot be known in a given physical situation.
Let us come to the standard interpretation of QM. This implies that a quan-
tum concept of truth exists which is basically different from the classical concept.
Indeed, the standard interpretation adopts a verificationist position which ab-
rogates the distinction between truth and epistemic accessibility of truth. To be
precise, it assumes that a statement of the form E(x) has a truth value if and
only if it is possible to provide an empirical proof of it, thus unifying definition
of truth and empirical accessibility of truth. The concept of empirical proof im-
plied by this definition, however, is not trivial. Indeed, according to QM, every
measurement on a physical object x generally modifies the state of x, so that
the obtained result refers to the final state and cannot be taken as indicative of
the truth value of E(x). Taking into account this basic feature, and the canon-
ical discussions usually carried out in order to provide an experimental basis to
the indeterminacy relations (Jammer, 1974; Messiah, 1961; Cohen-Tannoudij et
al., 1973; Greiner, 1989) one concludes that the following criterion of truth is
implicitly adopted within the standard interpretation of QM.
EV (empirical verificationism) 4. A statement of the form E(x) has a truth
value (true/false), hence a meaning, whenever the physical object x is in the
state S, if and only if an empirical test can be carried out that specifies this
truth value without altering the state S of x.
In order to distinguish the concept of truth introduced by the standard
interpretation of QM from the classical (Tarskian) concept of truth, we say that
E(x) is Q-true (Q-false) in the following whenever E(x) is true (false) in the
sense established by criterion EV.
Criterion EV has some relevant consequences. Indeed, it implies that, when-
ever x is given, hence its state S is known, not all statements of the fragment
E(x) have a truth value, so that QM is not semantically objective with respect
to E(x). Moreover, E(x) can be partitioned into three subsets, as follows.
ES(x) : the set of all statements of E(x) that are Q-true. One can prove
that this set coincides with the set of all statements that are Q-true for every
physical object in the state S.
E⊥
S
(x) : the set of all statements of E(x) that are Q-false. One can prove
that this set coincides with the set of all statements that are Q-false for every
physical object in the state S.
EI
S
(x) : the set E(x) \ ES(x) ∪ E
⊥
S
(x) of all statements of E(x) that are
meaningless, or indeterminate.
It follows from the definitions above that the set ES(x) ∪ E
⊥
S
(x) is the set of
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all statements of E(x) that have a quantum truth value whenever the physical
object x is in the state S. A priori, the knowledge of S does not imply the
knowledge of ES(x) ∪ E
⊥
S
(x). It can be proved, however, that this implication
holds in QM. Hence, QM allows one to deduce the truth values of all statements
of ES(x)∪E
⊥
S
(x), whenever S is given. This means that QM can predict the truth
values of all statements of E(x) that have a truth value according to criterion
EV. Thus, we conclude that QM is semantically complete with respect to E(x).
For the sake of brevity we understand the reference to the fragment E(x) in
the following. Thus, we can comment on the results obtained above by saying
that any conclusion about the semantic objectivity and the semantic complete-
ness of QM is strictly linked to the theory of truth that one adopts for the
language of QM (of course, this illustrates a general feature of physical theories:
a physical theory that is semantically objective, or complete, whenever a given
theory of truth is chosen, may be semantically nonobjective, or incomplete, if a
different choice is done).
5 Back to EPR
We have seen in Sec. 4 that two different theories of truth for (a fragment of)
the observative language of QM underlie the EPR argument and the standard
interpretation of QM. It is then apparent that the choice of a Tarskian theory
of truth would imply a local and noncontextual interpretation of QM because
of semantic objectivity (we have already noted in Sec. 4 that the Tarskian
definition of truth does not make any reference to the procedures that can be
used in order to know truth values, in particular measurement procedures). This
interpretation would avoid a bulk of problems (in particular, those following
from nonlocality and pointed out at the end of Sec. 3). One is thus led to
wonder why physicists have refused this seemingly plain alternative.
The answer to the foregoing question can be mainly found in the existence
of a number of ‘no-go theorems’, the most famous of which are the Bell-Kochen-
Specker (briefly Bell-KS) theorem (Bell, 1966; Kochen and Specker, 1967; Mer-
min, 1993), which is maintained to prove the contextuality of QM, and the Bell
theorem (Bell, 1964; Mermin, 1993), which is maintained to prove the nonlo-
cality of QM. Both, of course, imply semantic nonobjectivity of QM 5. Because
of these theorems, any attempt to provide a noncontextual and local interpre-
tation of QM is usually rejected with annoyance by quantum physicists, and
considered a na¨ıve misunderstanding of the subtelties of quantum physics.
Nevertheless, the physical meaning of the no-go theorems can be disputed.
A critical analysis of it has been carried out by ourselves together with other
authors (Garola and Solombrino, 1996a, 1996b; Garola, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003;
Garola and Pykacz, 2004) and it is relevant in our opinion since it opens the
way to a new interpretation of QM which adopts a Tarskian theory of truth,
hence it is noncontextual and local, in good agreement with EPR’s position.
Therefore, let us briefly summarize it.
First of all, let us preliminarily remind that, according to the received view-
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point (Sec. 4), every physical theory T states a number of theoretical physical
laws by using its theoretical language. These laws have no direct empirical in-
terpretation, but one can deduce from them, via correspondence rules, empirical
physical laws, which are expressed by means of the observative language of T
and then associated, via assignment rules, with empirical procedures that allow
one to confirm or falsify them.
Let us come now to QM. In order to apply the above scheme to this theory,
we must refine the last part of it, since empirical laws cannot be checked in every
physical situation according to QM. Indeed, there are physical situations that
can be described within the metalanguage of QM but are not empirically ac-
cessible, in the sense that it is impossible, in principle, to produce empirically a
situation of this kind or recognize empirically whether it occurs. If one wonders
about the validity of empirical laws within these physical situations, one can
choose between two different epistemological positions, that are inspired to on-
tological realism (OR) and empiricism (E), and that can be loosely synthetized
as follows.
OR. The mathematical apparatus of T mirrors some kind of physical reality,
and theoretical laws parallel (up to some unavoidable approximations) the laws
of physical reality. It follows that the empirical laws deduced from theoretical
laws are valid in every conceivable physical situation, be it empirically accessible
or not.
The above assumption about the validity of empirical physical laws has
been called metatheoretical classical principle, or MCP, in some previous pa-
pers (Garola and Solombrino, 1996a, 1996b; Garola, 1999; Garola and Pykacz,
2004).
E. The mathematical apparatus of T is considered as a rational construc-
tion that is justified by its ability of connecting and predicting empirical facts.
Theoretical laws have no truth value, since they are not directly interpreted,
and the empirical laws deduced from them are valid in all accessible physical
situations, i.e., in those physical situations in which they can be confirmed or
falsified (while they can be valid as well as not valid in nonaccessible physical
situations).
The above assumption about the validity of empirical physical laws has been
called metatheoretical generalized principle, or MGP, in some previous papers
(Garola and Solombrino, 1996a, 1996b; Garola, 1999, 2000, 2002; Garola and
Pykacz, 2004) 6.
It is rather odd that standard QM, whose verificationist attitude (Sec. 4) is
explicitly rooted into antimetaphysical committments, adopts implicitly position
OR when deducing the no-go theorems mentioned above. In order to justify this
demanding statement, let us look into this topic in more details by referring to
a specific sample case, that is, the Bell-KS theorem (Garola and Solombrino,
1996b; Garola, 2002; Garola and Pykacz, 2004).
The Bell-KS theorem is always proved ab absurdo in the literature. One
firstly introduces an objectivity condition (O), as follows.
O. All physical observables have simultaneous values in all physical situa-
tions independently of our knowledge of them.
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Then, one introduces the condition that the values of physical observables
are consistent with quantum laws (KS condition) as follows.
KS. If f(A,B,C, ...) = 0 is an empirical law of QM (where A, B, C, ...
denote compatible observables), the values a, b, c ... of A, B, C, ..., respectively,
are such that f(a, b, c, ...) = 0.
Finally, one shows that assuming conditions O and KS together leads to a
contradiction. Since condition KS seems to follow directly from QM, hence it
cannot be denied without renouncing QM, one deduces that assumption O is un-
tenable within QM. But assumption O is obviously equivalent to the assumption
that QM is semantically objective. It follows that QM is a semantically nonob-
jective, hence contextual, theory (which prohibits the adoption of a Tarskian
theory of truth).
The above proof seems conclusive. Nevertheless, if one looks more deeply
into it, one sees that the repeated application of the KS condition produces
physical situations that are not empirically accessible. Indeed, each empirical
law that is applied contains only mutually compatible observables, but there
are observables in some laws that are not compatible with observables that
appear in other laws. The physical situation in which all these observables have
simultaneous values can be conceived but cannot be empirically recognized,
hence it is not empirically accessible in the sense specified above. Applying
repeatedly the KS condition implies assuming that empirical quantum laws are
valid in a situation of this kind, which is legitimate only if one assumes implicitly
position OR about the validity of the empirical laws of MQ.
Our analysis has far-reaching consequences. Indeed, it implies that condition
KS does not follow directly from QM, since it requires an implicit epistemologi-
cal assumption about the range of validity of empirical laws to QM. Hence, the
contradiction proved by the Bell-KS theorem can be avoided not only renounc-
ing condition O and maintaining condition KS, but also maintaining O and
renouncing the validity of empirical laws of QM within nonaccessible physical
situations, which amounts to limit the validity of condition KS and say that it
cannot, generally, be applied repeatedly (note that this does not invalidate any
standard result in QM) 7. It follows that the semantic nonobjectivity of QM is
not a logical necessity. Moreover, a similar analysis can be done by referring to
the Bell theorem, showing that also nonlocality is not a logical necessity (Garola
and Solombrino, 1996b; Garola and Pykacz, 2004). One concludes that, con-
trary to an almost universal belief, it is possible to envisage new interpretations
of QM adopting a Tarskian theory of truth for the observative language of QM.
As we have anticipated at the beginning of this section, an interpretation of this
kind would avoid the difficulties following from contextuality and nonlocality
and would be compatible with EPR’s philosophical position (in particular, it
would classify QM as semantically incomplete). The price to pay for this, of
course, is accepting a more modest gnoseological role of our physical theories.
We add that the reasonings leading to the no-go theorems (whose math-
ematical correctness is undisputable) would still be relevant within the new
interpretation. Indeed, consider again the specific case of the Bell-KS theorem.
The contradiction following from assuming conditions O and KS together would
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not show that QM is nonobjective, but that condition KS cannot be applied re-
peatedly, hence there must be empirical quantum laws that cannot hold within
nonaccessible physical situations. This suggests that a physical theory could
exist which generalizes QM, reducing to it in all empirically accessible physical
situations only.
6 The SR interpretation
An interpretation of QM of the kind envisaged at the end of Sec. 5 has been
actually produced by ourselves, together with other authors, in a series of papers
(Garola, 1991, 1999, 2000; Garola and Solombrino, 1996a, 1996b). It has been
called SR interpretation, where SR stands for semantic realism, since according
to it QM is semantically objective, which is compatible with various forms of
realism (in particular, with macroscopic realism). The SR interpretation has
also been supported by some set-theoretical models that prove its consistency
(Garola, 2002, 2003; Garola and Pykacz, 2004).
Of course, the SR interpretation exhibits all features mentioned at the end
of Sec. 5, since it adopts a Tarskian truth theory for the observative language
of QM. Thus, in some sense, it continues and integrates EPR’s approach, at
least from a semantic viewpoint. We maintain that it allows one to solve many
problems, avoiding some well known paradoxes of standard QM. In particular,
the following results can be attained.
(i) No EPR-like paradox occurs, since QM is a local and noncontextual
theory (Garola and Solombrino, 1996b; Garola, 1999).
(ii) The quantum measurement problem is reconsidered and solved in semi-
classical terms (Garola and Pykacz, 2004).
(iii) Some suggestions are provided for embedding QM within the more gen-
eral theory mentioned at the end of Sec. 5.
In addition, our arguments in Sec. 5 lead us to suspect that the difficulties
encountered by physicists attempting to attain CM as a limit of QM, or to unify
QM and relativity, could have a common cause. Indeed, both CM and (special
or general) relativity adopt a Tarskian theory of truth for their observative
language, while standard QM introduces, as we have seen in Sec.3, a notion of
quantum truth that is not compatible with Tarski’s. Should this conjecture be
true, adopting the SR interpretation would eliminate the source of the aforesaid
difficulties.
Our conjecture above sounds however rather abstract. But our analysis
in Sec. 4 allows us to support it with a more detailed description of some
suggestions provided by the adoption of the SR interpretation. Indeed, non-
contextuality and locality of QM within this interpretation are attained at the
expense of accepting the epistemological position E in Sec. 5, which limits the
range of validity of empirical quantum laws (the only empirical consequence of
this acceptance should be that in any quantum measurement there are phys-
ical objects that are not detected, see Garola, 2003, and Garola and Pykacz,
2004). Analogous limits could then be assumed for quantum field theories in
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order to recover noncontextuality, which is a crucial issue, since contextuality
is a major obstacle to the unification of QM and relativity. Furthermore, since
the SR interpretation is an example of the class of interpretations envisaged at
the end of Sec. 4, it suggests that a broader theory embedding QM could be
constructed, the laws of which differ from quantum laws only in nonaccessible
physical situations. Thus, it is rather natural to think that CM should be a
limiting case of this broader theory, which explains the partial failure of the
attempts to recover CM as a limiting case of standard QM.
The foregoing suggestions, of course, only sketch a research program, and
no one can guarantee that the expected results will actually be found. Yet, our
program has the merit, at least, of propounding a new approach to old, unsolved
theoretical problems, based on a deep change of physicists’ epistemological atti-
tude rather than on new mathematical techniques and assumptions. Since the
standard approach has been only partially successful till now, the new program
is worth of attention in our opinion.
We would like to close our paper with a brief remark regarding quantum
logic (QL). Indeed, we want to stress that the introduction of an interpretation
that adopts a classical theory of truth for the observative language of QM does
not mean that QL must be rejected. Rather, it leads to interpret QL as a logical
structure formalizing the properties of a metalinguistic concept that does not
coincide with truth (to be precise, the pragmatic concept of justification in QM).
This interpretation is consistent with the adoption of an integrated perspective,
which aims to incorporate classical and nonclassical logical systems into a unified
framework that preserves both the globality of logic and the classical notion of
truth as correspondence (Garola, 2005).
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NOTES
1. The possibility of distinguishing between theoretical and observative lan-
guage of a physical theory has been often criticized on the basis of the argument
that theory and observation are strictly intertwined. We have already summa-
rized our position about this problem elsewhere (Garola and Sozzo, 2004, foot-
note 3). Here we remind only that we agree that the choice of the observative
language depends on the theory and that also the observative domain can be
seen as theory-laden. Yet, we maintain that theoretical and observative lan-
guage can still be distinguished if one accepts Campbell’s principle (Campbell,
1920), according to which the part of the theory embodied within the obser-
vative domain must not depend on the theoretical structure that one wants to
interpret (in order to remind this principle, the observative language could also
be called pre-theoretical language).
2. The EPR argument can easily be restated in terms of statements of the
form E(x). In the specific case considered by EPR, indeed, x may be taken to
indicate a sample of the combined system consisting of systems I and II, and
statements as “system I has momentum p” or “system II has position r” can
be translated into the statements “x has the property that the momentum of
its component system I has value p”, and “x has the property that the position
of its component system II has value r”, respectively, that have the required
form. It is then apparent that EPR’s reality condition and locality assumption
are compatible with the adoption of a Tarskian theory of truth for E(x) (by
the way, we remind that physical properties are usually identified in QM with
pairs (A,∆), where A is a physical observable and ∆ a Borel set on the real
line, see, e.g., Beltrametti and Casinelli, 1981; the properties that appear in our
translations can obviously be written in this way).
3. Note that ‘realistic’ completions of QM can be contrived that are nonlocal,
as exemplified by Bohm’s theory (Bohm, 1952a, 1952b). Also this theory is
compatible with the adoption of a Tarskian truth theory for the observative
language of QM. Yet, a statement which attributes a property to a physical
object cannot be considered elementary according to Bohm’s theory, and may
have no syntactic expression in some physical situations.
4. From an empirical viewpoint, criterion EV introduces the requirement
that, before performing a test of the truth value of E(x), one has to prove that
the test does not modify the state S of x. The empirical procedure that one
must adopt in order to fulfill this requirement is not obvious, and it must be
worked out by taking into account the laws of QM (Garola, 2005).
5. The assertion that QM is semantically nonobjective can also be based
on theoretical and epistemological considerations (indeterminacy principle plus
a verificationist position) or on empirical arguments (double slit experiment).
Both these approaches, however, are problematical (Garola, 2000), even if the
latter is almost universally used in the manuals. The theorems mentioned above,
instead, seem to be conclusive because of their mathematical rigour.
6. We maintain that MGP could be formalized by formalizing firstly the
observative language of QM and then reconsidering the truth mode of empirical
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laws within the framework of a Kripkian semantics. In short, one should define
a non trivial accessibility relation on the set of all possible worlds and assume
that empirical laws are valid only in those worlds that are in the accessibility
relation with the real world. However, we will not discuss this topic in the
present paper.
7. Of course, one could avoid any contradiction also giving up both condition
O and condition KS. We do not take into account this possibility here, since it
does not seem plausible from a physical viewpoint.
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Riassunto. Gli argomenti introdotti da Einstein, Podolski e Rosen (EPR)
per dimostrare l’incompletezza della meccanica quantistica (MQ) furono respinti
dalla maggioranza dei fisici contemporanei di EPR e non sono accettati nell’inter-
pretazione standard della MQ, secondo cui la MQ e` una teoria completa. Se si
analizzano le implicazioni semantiche delle due posizioni in conflitto si deduce
che esse sottendono due diverse nozioni di verita`. L’introduzione di una nozione
non classica da parte dell’interpretazione standard e` usualmente giustificata
facendo riferimento ai noti teoremi che proverebbero che la MQ e` necessaria-
mente una teoria contestuale e non locale. Comunque, questi teoremi sono basati
su una dubbia assunzione epistemologica implicita. Se tale assunzione viene
evitata, e` possibile concepire un’interpretazione alternativa all’interpretazione
standard che e` realistica in senso semantico. Nell’ambito di questa interpre-
tazione e` possibile recuperare il punto di vista di EPR, e la MQ e` considerata
una teoria (semanticamente) incompleta, locale e non contestuale. Inoltre la
nuova interpretazione fornisce alcuni suggerimenti per costruire una teoria piu`
generale che incorpori la MQ e per connettere la MQ con la fisica classica e la
relativita`.
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